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Out of Sight, Out of Mind:
Indefinite Confinement and the Unconstitutional
Treatment of North Carolinians with Mental
Retardation
INTRODUCTION*

In 2008, Floyd Brown was released from Dorothea Dix Hospital in
Raleigh, North Carolina, following a fourteen-year, involuntary psychiatric
commitment.' Brown's commitment to Dorothea Dix followed a criminal
accusation and determination that, because of his mental retardation,2 he
was incapable of proceeding to trial. He remained in a secure environment
for well over a decade without a trial or the opportunity to confront his
accuser-effectively denying him his constitutional protections as a United
States citizen.4
In 1993, following a tip to local law enforcement, Brown became a
suspect in the homicide of a woman in Anson County, North Carolina.5 A
fellow resident reported that he heard from an unidentified man claiming to
have witnessed the crime that Brown was the perpetrator.6
The
* This article is dedicated to the thousands of North Carolinians who are so often
overlooked by the protective eyes of the law and who are in need of advocates zealously
fighting for their equal treatment. I would like to thank my wife Jean for her unwavering
love and support. I owe all of my success, including the completion of this project, to her
encouragement and patience, and I will forever be indebted to her.
1. See Scott Michels, Man Held Without Trial for 14 Years, ABC NEWS.COM (Oct. 2,
2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3673696&page-l#.TwYTAZggvgo.
2. The term "mental retardation" is the medically appropriate term associated with
people who have "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(22) (2011).
See also AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, infra note 77.
3. See Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, SBI Ignores Years of Warnings on Confession
Called 'Fiction', NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/
2010/08/08/61946 1/sbi-ignores-years-of-warnings.html.
4. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . . . [and] to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... ").
5. See Susan Greene & Miles Moffeit, 14 Years Later: Tell Ay Story,
DENVERPOST.COM (July 26, 2007), http://www.denverpost.com/evidence/ci_6455487.

6. Id.
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unidentified man was never discovered or questioned, and Brown was not
placed at or near the scene, but he was arrested, questioned, and held on the
accusation.7 In addition, Brown is alleged to have waived his Miranda
rights and to have offered a detailed, signed confession of the crime-a
task that would have been beyond Brown's intellectual capability.8
Chapter 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes provides the
guidelines under which a person, following an incident, may be
involuntarily committed to a mental health institution if questions are
raised regarding his or her stability or general welfare.9 Section 15A-1001
of the North Carolina General Statutes prohibits prosecution of a person
who is incapable of comprehending the charges against him.' 0 Together,
these two statutory schemes give courts wide latitude to commit individuals
with mental retardation to psychiatric institutions" for extended periods of
time on the sole basis of their "incapacity to proceed." 2 This was the fate
of Floyd Brown who found himself indefinitely restrained "for treatment
[of his mental retardation][,] ...

a condition from which he cannot

3

recover"' -the victim of an unintended cycle created by North Carolina's
civil commitment and criminal procedure statutes.
The primary purpose of this Comment is to analyze North Carolina's
civil commitment and criminal procedure statutes. Specifically, focus will
be given to criminal defendants with mental retardation, who, when
accused of a crime and found incapable of proceeding to trial, are
involuntarily confined without the due process protections afforded nondisabled persons. This Comment argues that North Carolina's statutory
scheme for the involuntary civil commitment of mentally disabled, criminal
defendantsl 4 fails to distinguish between the "mentally ill" and the

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See generallyN.C. GEN. STAT. §

122C

(2011).

10. See id § 15A-1001.
11. Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams, Chaos Theory and the Social Control
Thesis: A Post-FoucauldianAnalysis of Mental Illness and Involuntary Civil Confinement,
26 Soc. JUSTICE 177, 186-87 (1999).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001.

13. The Arc of North Carolina & Carolina Legal Assistance, Brief of Amici Curiae in
Support of Floyd Lee Brown Application of Writ of Habeas Corpus, THE ARC OF NORTH
CAROLINA POLICY (Oct. 8, 2007) http://thearcnc.blogspot.com/2007/10/amicus-brief-insupport-of-floyd-brown.html (arguing on behalf of Floyd Brown for his release on the
grounds that his confinement violates principles of basic fairness and due process) (on file
with the author).
14. See generallyN.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C.
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"mentally retarded,"" a critical difference that creates the circumstances
under which a person with mental retardation can be indefinitely and
unconstitutionally confined.
A secondary purpose of this Comment is to propose several legislative
and procedural solutions that would afford equal protection for persons
with mental retardation who are incapable of proceeding to trial. Such
solutions would prevent long-term hospitalizations like the fourteen-year
confinement sustained by Floyd Brown.
Part I of this Comment will identify the fundamental public policy in
North Carolina that aims to provide fair and equal protection for all citizens
facing criminal charges. The term "incapacity to proceed" will be defined,
and its determinative test examined. In addition, Part I will analyze the
statutory scheme of civil commitment in North Carolina. Part II will
briefly identify United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on involuntary
commitment to identify its lack of protection for persons with mental
retardation. Part III will explore several basic constitutional protections,
particularly those found in article I, sections 19 and 21 of the Constitution
of the State of North Carolina, intended to protect criminal defendants'
basic liberty interests. Part IV will identify a statutory gap involving the
determination of "dangerousness" in defendants and identify how this gap
permits the indefinite confinement of a person with mental retardation.
Finally, Part V will draw several conclusions about the current statutory
scheme and identify possible solutions that could afford criminal
defendants with mental retardation specific protections aimed at preventing
unreasonably long involuntary commitments in secure psychiatric facilities.

15. The term "mentally ill" indicates a medical condition with treatable, possibly
curable, symptoms. For example, depression and bi-polar disorder can be effectively
treated with targeted medication. ValueOptions, Differentiating Between Mental
Retardation/DevelopmentalDisabilityandMental Illness, ARKANSAS.VALUEOPTIONS.COM 9
(last visited April 5, 2013), http://arkansas.valueoptions.com/provider/training/
Differentiating_MentalRetardation-Developmental DisabilityMentalIllness
Webinar.pdf. In such cases, people who were at one time incapable of proceeding to trial
may be rendered competent. "Mentally retarded" is a term that refers to an intellectual and
developmental disability that will never be cured or treated in such a manner that could
counter its effects. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(12a) (defining "developmental
disability," in part, as a mental impairment manifesting prior to age twenty-two that is
"likely to continue indefinitely"). In other words, a person with an IQ of fifty (i.e.,
Moderate Mental Retardation), see infra note 77, cannot take medication to increase his IQ
by twenty points, rendering him competent for trial. See ValueOptions, Differentiating
Between
Mental Retardation/Developmental Disability and Mental Illness,
2013),
5,
April
visited
(last
9
ARKANSAS.VALUEOPTIONS.COM
http://arkansas.valueoptions.com/provider/training/Differentiating_MentalRetardationDevelopmentalDisabilityMentalIllnessWebinar.pdf.
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NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC POLICY

It is the fundamental public policy of North Carolina that all citizens,
regardless of race, gender, or mental ability, are treated fairly and equally.16
The North Carolina constitution requires that all persons "restrained of ...
liberty" be permitted to "inquire into the lawfulness [of such restraint],"
thereby protecting the writ of habeas corpus.1 In order to ensure such a
level of fairness, equality, and reasonable inquiry, North Carolina courts
have carved out a special protection for those individuals whose mental
competence during criminal proceedings is in question.' 8 This protection,
codified by the North Carolina General Assembly, exists to ensure a fair
trial for all individuals by expressly prohibiting the "trying, convicting,
sentencing, or punishing [of] a criminal defendant. . . 'when by reason of
mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of
the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation ... or to
assist in his defense . . . ."'l9 In creating this prosecutorial restriction, the
legislature established a policy that protects individuals accused of criminal
acts from prosecution during a time of mental incapacity-ensuring a fair
trial and preserving the individual's right to due process.20
Involuntary commitment to a secure psychiatric institution is a
restriction on an individual's fundamental right to liberty as provided in the
North Carolina constitution. 2 1 As such, in order to restrict one's
16. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("We hold it to be self-evident that all persons are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of
happiness."); see also State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (N.C. 1949). The North
Carolina Supreme Court held:
The term "liberty" . . . does not consist simply of the right to be free from arbitrary
physical restraint or servitude, but is "deemed to embrace the right of man to be
free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his
Creator .... It includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or vocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes to a successful conclusion."
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 21.
18. See State v. Aychte, 391 S.E.2d 43, 45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1001.
19. Jennifer L. Morris, Comment, Criminal Defendants Deemed Incapable to Proceed
to Trial:An Evaluation ofNorth Carolina'sStatutory Scheme, 26 CAMPBELL L. REv. 41, 43
(2004) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a)).
20. See Aychte, 391 S.E.2d at 45; see also Morris, supra note 19, at 43.
21. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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fundamental right to remain free with involuntary commitment, the state
must demonstrate a compelling relationship between maintaining the safety
of all its citizens, and infringing on personal liberty for the sake of
community protection.2 2 Applied to the involuntary commitment of a
criminal defendant to a mental institution absent a criminal trial or
conviction, due process requires that the state's interest in community
23 Narrowing this
protection outweigh the individual's liberty interest.
balancing test in favor of the defendant at risk of confinement, the United
States Supreme Court held that a mentally ill person cannot be
of
showing
additional
an
without
committed
involuntarily
dangerousness
of
showing
a
without
commitment
and
"dangerousness,"24
25
North Carolina
is a violation of an individual's due process rights.
adopted this public policy in regards to mentally ill patients, requiring
something more than mere mental illness-i.e., a showing of
dangerousness, albeit loosely defined 2 6 -in order to involuntarily commit a
person who is facing criminal charges and is determined to be incapable of
proceeding.27
A.

"Incapacity"Defined
North Carolina criminal procedure explicitly forbids the prosecution

of an individual who, "by reason of mental illness or defect, . . . is unable to

understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him. ... "
"Incapacity to proceed" is defined as a defendant's inability to comprehend

22. Morris, supra note 19, at 46-47 ("Substantive due process requires that before a
person may be involuntarily committed, the state's interests both in protecting society and
the mentally ill individual must be shown to outweigh the individual's interest in personal
liberty.").
23. Id.; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
24. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
25. Id.
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11) (2011).
27. See In re Rogers, 306 S.E.2d 510, 512-13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding the
constitutionality of involuntary commitment proceedings, as found generally in chapters
15A and 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes, on grounds that patient was not held
indefinitely and that he was subject to release pending a determination of dangerousness to
others); see also In re Collins, 271 S.E.2d 72, 76-77 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). Collins is
distinguishable on the grounds that the patient was not a criminal defendant. Id. at 73.
However, the holding remains applicable since, upon a finding of incapacity by a trial court,
a criminal defendant's involuntary commitment is governed under the same civil
commitment statute-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-goveming commitment of non-criminal
defendants. See id. at 76-77; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1003.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001.
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proceedings and participate in his own defense.29
The statutes
subsequently provide additional clarity by defining "mental illness" as "an
illness which so lessens the capacity of the individual to use self-control,
judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as
to make it necessary . .. for him to be under treatment, care, supervision,

guidance, or control." 30
The North Carolina Supreme Court's
interpretation of this definitional standard has resulted in the creation of a
test of mental capacity that is carried out by the trial court, often without
the aid of a jury." As a result, when a trial judge makes a determination
that an individual is incapable of proceeding to trial based on competent
evidence, the determination is deemed conclusive for the purpose of

appeal. 32

The test of mental capacity has been further refined to require a "clear,
cogent, and convincing" showing of competent evidence that the individual
charged is "mentally ill . .. and dangerous to himself or others, or is

mentally retarded." 3 This determination of the competency of evidence is
for the trial judge and, like the determination of mental capacity generally,
is conclusive for the purposes of appeal.34 The appellate court's function is
merely to determine whether the judge erred in his discernment of
evidentiary competence. Interestingly, and of particular concern, is that
since the evidence is most often presented to the court36 prior to the
commencement of proceedings, as a preliminary question of fact, it is not

29. Id.; see State v. Bowman, 666 S.E.2d 831, 836 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (defining a
person as "mentally incompetent" if he lacks the ability to properly consult with his attorney
or if he lacks a "factual understanding of the proceedings against him").
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(21)(i).
31. See State v. Clark, 265 S.E.2d 204, 208 (N.C. 1980) (holding the test of mental
capacity to be whether the defendant has, "at the time of trial, the mental capacity to
comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate with his counsel to the
end that any available defense may be interposed").
32. See In re Monroe, 270 S.E.2d 537, 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
33. In re Jackson, 299 S.E.2d 677, 679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted).
34. See Monroe, 270 S.E.2d at 539.
35. Id.
36. In some instances, the evidence is offered to a magistrate judge who makes a
determination of mental illness and issues a secure custody order for involuntary
commitment based entirely on witness testimony and certification. See, e.g., In re
Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a hearing before a
magistrate to decide a petition for an involuntary commitment order is a "miscellaneous
proceeding" under Rule 1101 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence where the restrictions
of the rules do not apply).
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subject to the more stringent rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule.
In fact, an individual may be deemed incapable to proceed and subject to a
secure custody order for involuntary commitment under section 122C-261
of the North Carolina General Statutes so long as the trial judge or
magistrate "finds reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged. . .
are true and that the [defendant] is probably mentally ill and either (i)
This standard of
dangerous to self ... or dangerous to others ....
the [witness's]
whether
state
expressly
not
"does
evidence
permissible
it can be in
whether
or
knowledge
knowledge must be based on personal
9
whole or in part based upon hearsay."0
The North Carolina Supreme Court confirmed this use of hearsay
evidence when it held that "the existence of [reasonable grounds for
commitment] is not concerned with the question of whether the offense
charged has been committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, but only with whether the [witness] has reasonable grounds for
his belief."40 As applied-at least initially-an individual who is mentally
retarded and presumed incapable of proceeding to trial can be subject to the
court ordering involuntary commitment on the grounds that another person
has presented reasonable evidence, albeit hearsay, that the accused
committed the crime and is a danger to himself.41
B.

Statutory Scheme-Involuntary Commitment andDisposition

Chapters 15A and 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes
provide the procedural foundation on which a person may be involuntarily
37. See N.C. R. EvID. 104(a) (2011).
38. Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d at 698 (citation omitted) (second emphasis added).
Following the issuance of a secured custody order pursuant to section 122C-261, a hearing
is required to determine the need for involuntary commitment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §
122C-268 (2011). Upon such a determination based in part on the defendant's incapacity to
proceed to trial, the statute requires that the defendant's commitment be governed under
chapter 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes. See infra Section I.B.
39. Id. Under circumstances where an individual may be temporarily incapacitated by
his mental illness or inebriation, it is plausible to see why this low threshold might be
permissible. Once a party regains competency, he is able to participate in his own defense
and challenge the evidence against him. In the case of a person with mental retardation,
however, the low threshold creates a standard whereby an individual may be confined based
on the hearsay testimony of a non-confronted witness, despite the fact that such a person
will never regain the competency necessary to participate in his own defense.
40. Id. at 699 (quoting State v. Campbell, 191 S.E.2d 752, 756 (N.C. 1972)). The
bracketed portion of the quotation originally used the term "probable cause," which the
North Carolina Supreme Court established as synonymous with the term "reasonable
grounds" earlier in the opinion. Id. This author exchanged the language for clarity.
41. See id.
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committed for an indefinite period of time following the accusation of a
crime and determination of their incapacity to proceed.42 Following the
accusation and arrest of a mentally retarded person, a judge may determine
that he is incapable of proceeding to trial or of understanding the charges
against him.4 3 If the defendant is deemed incapable, the judge must make a
determination of whether there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant meets the criteria" for involuntary commitment under chapter
122C.4
This decision by the judge will be chiefly determined by a
psychiatric professional's determination as to whether the individual is
considered to be at risk of being dangerous, either to himself or toward
others.4 5 If the presiding judge finds "reasonable grounds" for the
commitment, he will issue a secured custody order, and the defendant will
be transported to a hospital or other designated facility.46 The statute does
indicate an exception for those individuals determined to be mentally
retarded but only insofar as they are not considered dangerous.47 Even
then, the exception merely provides for treatment in a facility that is not
designated specifically for the mentally ill. 48
While the statute generally permits only a temporary detention of the
defendant, 4 9 sections 15A-1004 and 122C-268.1 provide the basis for a
longer commitment.50 Section 15A-1004 provides that if a defendant is
determined to be safe for release from the hospital or other institution
where he has been committed, he is to be released back into the custody of
law enforcement for prosecution.5 '
Further, following an initial

42. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 122C, art. 5, pt. 7 ("Involuntary Commitment of
the Mentally Ill; Facilities for the Mentally Ill"); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 15A, subch. X, art. 56
("Incapacity to Proceed").
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001.
44. Id. § 15A-1003.
45. See id. § 122C-263(d)(2) ("If the physician or eligible psychologist finds that the
respondent is mentally ill and is dangerous to self . .. the physician or eligible psychologist
shall recommend inpatient commitment. . . .").
46. See id. § 15A-1003 (indicating that upon the court's issuance of a secure
commitment order, the defendant is governed under the civil commitment statute found in
chapter 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes).
47. See id. § 122C-263(d)(2).
48. See id.
49. See id. § 15A-1003.
50. See id. § 15A-1004; see also id. § 122C-268.1 (providing for the ongoing
commitment of a patient who is classified under section 122C-3 as "Dangerous to Himself'
or "Dangerous to Others," and placing the burden of contrary proof on the patient).
51. See id. § 15A-1004(c). While this procedure is logical for a person with a treatable
mental illness, it creates a cycle for the mentally retarded defendant who, upon release into
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involuntary commitment period, a defendant bears the burden of proof that
52
If such
he is either no longer mentally ill or a danger to himself or others.
a showing is made, then the court "shall order the [defendant] discharged
and released."5 3 If no such showing is made, then the court "shall order
that inpatient commitment continue . ..

.

"54 The clerk of court is required

to maintain a docket of defendants who are involuntarily committed and
56
incapable of proceeding." This docket is reviewed at least semiannually,
and so long as the prosecuting authority does not dismiss the charges
against the defendant, he may remain committed indefinitely. While the
North Carolina General Assembly recognized and codified the
requirements for dismissing charges against individuals lacking the
capacity to proceed, the requirements hardly protect against the loss of
liberty that the statutory proceedings permit.5 8
C.

DangerousnessStandard

It is a fundamentally held principle that a person cannot be
59 Rather, a
involuntarily confined based on their mental illness alone.
showing of "dangerousness," either to oneself or towards another, is
the custody of law enforcement, will be returned to the hospital upon further determination
of his continued incapacity to proceed.
52. Id. § 122C-268.1(i).
5 3. Id.
54. Id.; see also infra note 80 (comparing definitions of "mentally retarded" and
"danger to self"). It is reasonable to suggest that a person with mental retardation will never
be capable of making such a showing before a trial court since, by the nature of his
disability, he will always be deemed incapable. Since the diagnostic criteria of "mentally
retarded" and "danger to self' are so similar, it would be difficult to negate one without the
other.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1005.
5 6. Id.
57. See id. § 15A-1008.
58. Id. (providing the court three circumstances under which charges against a
defendant lacking the capacity to proceed may be dismissed: (1) when "it appears ... the
defendant will not gain capacity to proceed"; (2) when "the defendant has been substantially
deprived of his liberty for a period of time equal to or in excess of the maximum permissible
period of confinement for the crime or crimes charged"; or (3) following a five- or ten-year
period (for misdemeanor or felony charges, respectively) from the date that the defendant
was deemed incapable to proceed). The statute does not provide a requirement under which
the prosecuting authority must dismiss charges. See id.
59. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("A finding of 'mental
illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will and keeping him
indefinitely in simple custodial confinement."); see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
720 (1972) (holding that a state cannot constitutionally commit a person for an indefinite
period simply on the basis of his incompetency to stand trial).
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required to justify a commitment.60 In North Carolina, the term "danger" is
divided into two categories by statute: "Dangerous to himself' and
"Dangerous to others." 6' It is the definition of "Dangerous to himself' that
is most critical to an understanding of how, and why, an individual with
mental retardation might be confined, without formal conviction, following
an accusation of criminal activity. The statute provides in part:
a. "Dangerous to himself' means that within the relevant past:
1. The individual has acted in such a way as to show:
I. That he would be unable, without care, supervision, and the
continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise
self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily
responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and
safety; and
II. That there is a reasonable probability of his suffering serious
physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate treatment
is given pursuant to this Chapter. A showing of behavior that is
grossly irrational, of actions that the individual is unable to control,
of behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation, or of other
evidence of severely impaired insight and judgment shall create a
prima facie inference that the individual is unable to care for
himself....62
A showing of dangerousness to self is, in part, a two-pronged test that
addresses both one's inability to care for oneself and the risk of debilitation
that is likely to result from such inability.63 Interestingly, there is no
requirement that this danger exist imminently, 64 or that the person have
made any overt acts implicating the existence of either prong.s Instead,

60. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 728.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(ll).
62. Id. §§ 122C-3(1 1)(a)(1)(I), (II).
63. In re Monroe, 270 S.E.2d 537, 540 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
64. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11)(a)(1)(II) (requiring only a risk of debilitation in
the near future).
65. See Monroe, 270 S.E.2d at 541 (indicating that "dangerousness" does not require
any overt actions, merely threats of harm within the relevant past or the reasonable
probability that such harmful behavior will be repeated); see also In re Collins, 271 S.E.2d
72, 76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (indicating that although "dangerousness" remains a required
element of involuntary commitment, the danger is no longer required to be "imminent").
Largely ignoring the second prong of the "Dangerous to himself' standard, the court has
failed to provide a clear distinction between the "imminent" requirement from the pre-1979
statute and the current, amended statutory requirement of "near future" debilitation. See,
e.g., id. This lack of distinction has resulted in judicial deference to physician testimony as
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the person need only be at risk, through a showing of previous acts, 6 6 of
danger to himself to qualify under this definitional requirement for
involuntary commitment.67 The threshold of "dangerous" behavior is low,
especially when viewed in conjunction with the medical diagnostic criteria
of "mental retardation."6 8 It is so low, in fact, and so similar to the
diagnostic standard of mental retardation, that it becomes apparent how a
person with mental retardation, accused of a violent crime, could be
considered dangerous and indefinitely confined.
D.

Mental Retardation Is Not a Mental Illness

Section 122C-3 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides
distinct definitions for the terms "mentally ill" and "mentally retarded,"69
but the distinction is lost when the statute incorporates application of the
dangerousness standard for the purpose of executing an involuntary
commitment order. 70 This is problematic primarily because the term
"mentally ill" presumes an ability to recover, or at least regain competency
to a level acceptable to proceed to trial. 7 1 Conversely, the term "mentally
retarded" is defined as "[of] significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior" and
does not include any of the presumptive "treatment" language included in
the "mentally ill" definition.7 2 This absence of presumptive language
to a defendant's propensity or likelihood of future debilitation to satisfy the second prong.
See id. at 247.
66. The statute does not expressly require a showing of past acts in order to justify a
finding of danger to self. However, such a showing is implied by the statute in that it
requires a physician's finding of risk as evidenced by a "showing of ... actions that the
individual is ... unable to care for himself." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3( 11)(a)(1)(II).
67. See In re Lowery, 428 S.E.2d 861, 864 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing the low
threshold for a showing of dangerousness). The holding in Lowery quotes the current,
amended statute. Id. The statute was amended to remove the specific, illustrative language
in favor of more general, descriptive language. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(l 1). The
amended language more closely mirrors the diagnostic criteria for determining the existence
of mental retardation. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, infra note 77.
68. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-3(21), (22).
70. See, e.g., id § 122C-268 (grouping the two categories together by requiring mental
illness with dangerousness as the prerequisite for involuntary commitment); see also id. §
122C-271 (permitting involuntary commitment upon a "clear, cogent, and convincing"
showing of "mental[] ill[ness] [and] . . . dangerousness").

71. See id. § 122C-3(21) (applying the term "treatment" to mental illness, indicating the
possibility of improvement); see also id. § 15A-1004 (requiring a mentally ill defendant
who has regained competency to be returned to court in order to proceed to trial).
72. Id. § 122C-3(22).
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indicates a lack of legislative understanding about the chronic and
untreatable nature of mental retardation, as do the subsequent statutory
procedures for involuntary commitment that generally fail to make a
distinction between mental illness and mental retardation.
The result is
legislative deference to the court to draw a distinction when issuing a
secured custody order.74 In doing so, the court will most often look to the
testimony of psychiatric experts, who in turn rely on diagnostic criteria and
characteristics to identify the likelihood of risks in mentally ill or mentally
retarded defendants.7 ' The application of diagnostic criteria to the
procedural requirements set forth in chapters 15A and 122C of the North
Carolina General Statutes may cause the indefinite commitment of
mentally retarded criminal defendants. 76
The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistics
Manual-IV-TR (hereinafter "DSM-IV") defines "Mental Retardation" as:
[S]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A)
that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at

least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home
living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, selfdirection, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety
(Criterion B). . .. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is
defined as an IQ of about 70 or below ....
Adaptive Functioning
[generally the predominant symptoms] refers to how effectively individuals
cope with common life demands and how well they meet the standards of
personal independence expected of someone in their particular age group,
sociocultural background, and community setting.7 7

The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged this definition of
mental retardation 78 and added that "mental retardation" means the inability
of one to adequately care for one's self "in the everyday world." 79 What is
73. The term "mental retardation" is mentioned only eight times in the entirety of

chapter 122C, article 5, part 7 of the North Carolina General Statutes, titled "Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Ill," of which most mentions do not make a distinction for
treatment. See, e.g., id. § 122C-271 (limiting the placement options for defendants who are
mentally retarded and mentally ill).
74. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 11, at 186.
75. Id.
76. See generally THE ARC OF NORTH CAROLINA POLICY, supra note 13 (identifying the
nature of the defendant's mental retardation as the chief factor for: (1) why he could not
have committed the crime for which he was accused; and (2) why his physicians continued
to classify him as "dangerous").
77. Am PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 41-42 (4th ed. text rev. 2000).
78. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
79. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
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most problematic by the Court's adaptation and acknowledgement of the
diagnostic standard for mental retardation is its similarity to the North
Carolina statutory definition of "dangerous."so
The DSM-1V identifies two necessary criteria for a diagnosis of
mental retardation: "subaverage intellectual functioning" and the more
8
readily apparent symptom, "deficits in adaptive functioning." '
Comparatively, the North Carolina General Statutes define "Dangerous to
himself' as: (1) acting in a manner that indicates "[that the defendant]
would be unable, without care, . . . to exercise self control . . . in the

conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations"; and (2) that this
inability creates a "reasonable probability of. . . suffering serious physical
,,82
Following a criminal accusation
debilitation within the near future ....
and determination of a defendant's incapacity to proceed, it is the
"dangerousness" component that justifies the on-going commitment of a
defendant based, in large part, on the statutory presumption that the illness
can be treated and the defendant returned to court. Yet, for the mentally
retarded defendant who cannot receive treatment, his permanent
disability-being a danger to himself-becomes the medical justification
for on-going commitment. 84 The court then, relying on the doctor's
finding, may order a confinement based on danger-a quality which, until
North Carolina
recently, was never considered offensive or criminal.
courts have consistently supported the notion that the compelling state
interest of protecting the community from people who are either dangerous
to themselves or others is served through involuntary commitment of

80. Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 77, with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C3(11) (2011). While the two definitions do not mirror one another, in practical application
to defendants with mental retardation, they are significantly similar. Mental retardation, in
part, requires a significant impairment in daily living skills. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra
note 77. Practically, such impairment will lead to a significant debilitation if left
unsupervised or unsupported. The two-pronged statutory definition of "Danger to []self'
states a significantly similar requirement: impairment with a risk of future debilitation
without supervision. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(1 1)(a)(1).
81. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N, supra note 77. Deficits include an inability to
properly or adequately care for one's self independently. See id.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11)(a)(1).
83. See id. § 15A-1004(e).
84. See THE ARC OF NORTH CAROLINA POLICY, supra note 13, at 10.
85. See Arrigo & Williams, supra note 11, at 179 (quoting Michael Foucault in stating,
"[D]anger has never constituted an offense. To be dangerous is not an offense .... It is not
a symptom.").
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dangerous criminal defendants, regardless of whether they have committed
an offense.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Jackson v. Indiana

The United States Supreme Court held that the confinement of a
person on the sole basis of being mentally ill was unconstitutional, setting
forth a policy protecting the liberty interests of individuals with mental
retardation. 7 The Court stated, "We hold ... that a person charged by a
State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his
incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than [a] reasonable
period of time. ... " The petitioner, "a mentally defective deaf mute with
a mental level of a pre-school child," was charged with robbery against two
women. 8 9 The total amount allegedly stolen was nine dollars. 90 Following
an initiation of trial proceedings, the trial court determined that the
petitioner "lack[ed] comprehension sufficient to make his defense" and
committed him to an institution operated by the Indiana Department of
Mental Health. 9' Petitioner's attorney argued before the trial court that
such a disposition "amounted to a 'life sentence' without his ever having
been convicted of a crime," but the trial court rejected that argument, and
the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the decision. 92
Petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court arguing that
his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were
violated by an Indiana statute that permitted confinement with a mere
showing of "mental illness."9 3 Petitioner reasoned that, but for the criminal
accusation, a confinement would have occurred under the more stringent
commitment statutes applicable to all other citizens. 94 Under the Indiana
statutes, a person's need for civil commitment was based on a higher
standard, conditions for release were more lenient, and there was access to

86. See e.g., In re Monroe, 270 S.E.2d 537, 539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); In re
Lowery, 428 S.E.2d 861, 864 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
87. See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
88. Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 717.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 719.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 719-23.
94. Id. at 723.
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greater privileges.9 5 Petitioner argued that if a criminal conviction is not a
sufficient reason to deprive a person of procedural and substantive due
process, then "the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice." 96
The Court agreed with the petitioner, holding:
[W]e cannot conclude that pending criminal charges provide a greater
justification for different treatment than conviction and sentence.
Consequently, we hold that by subjecting [petitioner] to a more lenient
commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those
generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus
condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the
showing required for commitment ... Indiana deprived petitioner of equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The holding in Jackson, opposing the virtual criminalization of mental
illness and requiring an equal standard applicable to all criminal defendants
and non-criminal patients,98 is distinguishable from the problem created by
the North Carolina statutes.
In fact, the Court recognizes this
distinguishing factor in its comparative analysis of the Indiana statute with
similar federal regulations on civil commitment.9 9 The Court recognizes
that in order for a person to be confined involuntarily, a showing of mental
illness and danger must be made. 00 The Court appears to suggest that a
showing of dangerousness is sufficient to implicate a commitment beyond
a "reasonable period of time." 10 1
Additionally, the Court held that if it could be determined that the
defendant would not attain capacity within a reasonable time, then it was
for the State to "institute [its] customary civil commitment proceeding[s]
that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen. ... " 1 02
While this holding by the Court ensured that the liberty interests of
mentally ill defendants were protected, it failed to recognize the

95. Id.
96. Id. at 724 (citing Commonwealth v. Druken, 254 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Mass. 1969)).
97. Id. at 729-30.
98. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1972) (conducting an Equal Protection
Clause analysis).
99. See id. at 731-32 (recognizing a "dangerousness" requirement as the most
significant difference between the two statutory procedures). The federal regulations to
which the Court refers can be found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-46 (2012).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 733 ("Without a finding of dangerousness, one committed [under federal law]
can be held only for a 'reasonable period of time' necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future."
(emphasis added)).
102. Id. at 738.
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permanency of mental retardation.10 3 The Jackson Court continued the
criminalization of "danger" by acquiescing to the indefinite commitment of
potentially dangerous defendants and by failing to create an exception for
the mentally retarded, who, in North Carolina, with an additional showing
of probable debilitation, could be deemed per se dangerous.1 0 4
B.

O'Connorv. Donaldson

In O'Connorv. Donaldson, the United States Supreme Court furthered
the notion that danger, either to self or others, could stand alone as the
determinant factor of indefinite confinement of a mentally retarded
person.os The respondent was civilly committed following a petition to the
court by his father and ultimately held involuntarily for over fifteen
years. 0 6
The hospital's superintendent continued to authorize the
respondent's commitment, despite repeated requests by the respondent to
be released, asserting that a release to his elderly parents could pose a
safety risk to both parties.' 07 Respondent brought a civil suit against the
superintendent of the state hospital alleging a malicious deprivation of his
constitutional liberty, 08 and the trial court held in respondent's favor.109
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court, upholding the
conclusion that a person involuntarily confined has a right to receive
treatment and should not be held beyond a reasonable time.110
Petitioner appealed the ruling to the United States Supreme Court
where respondent argued that although he may have been initially
committed for a justifiable reason, his due process rights were violated
when his commitment ceased being for treatment and instead became a
mere custodial placement."' In its analysis, the Court initially looked to
Jackson and determined that the duration of the respondent's confinement
was constitutionally suspect since it appeared to extend beyond a
reasonable measure of time." 2 Confirming the holding in Jackson, the
Court emphasized that mental illness alone "cannot justify a State's locking

103. See id. (permitting the indefinite commitment of individuals who fail to attain
capacity).
104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
105. Morris, supra note 19, at 47.
106. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 564 (1975).
107. Id. at 567-70.
108. Id. at 563.
109. Id. at 572.
110. Id. at 572-73.
111. Id. at 567-69.
112. Id. at 574-75.
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a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple
custodial confinement."" 3 The Court suggested that there must be
something more to the person's condition than the mere possibility of substandard living conditions to justify "incarcerating" him for the purpose of
providing a higher standard of living.1 4 Specifically, "while the State may
arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if
ever a necessary condition for raising . . . living standards .

. . ."'

The

Court continued in stating that "a State cannot constitutionally confine
without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely
in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends.""16
The holding in O'Connor is an affirmation of the Jackson decision. It

clearly indicates the Court's aversion to the confinement of mentally ill
persons without a showing of some level of dangerousness" 7 and confirms
the notion that the justification for confinement must continually "exist
throughout the institutionalization.""t 8 Like Jackson, O'Connorcarves out
a quasi-criminal characteristic for danger, and at least considers the idea
that a "State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm."" 9 In
an attempt to protect the liberty interests of the mentally ill, by requiring
states to demonstrate a greater interest in confining mentally ill persons
through a showing of dangerousness, the Court has instead provided an
exception to the rule against indefinite commitment. While the North
Carolina statutes appear to generally conform to the policies set forth in
Jackson'2 0 and O'Connor,121 they fail to place any limits on the involuntary
commitment of people accused of being dangerous, and they particularly
fail to provide an applicable standard for the confinement of those in need
of help to live independently.

113. Id. at 575.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 576.
117. Id.
118. Laura W. Harper, Comment, Involuntary Commitment of People with Mental
Retardation: Ensuring Georgia's Citizens Receive Adequate Procedural Due Process, 58
MERCER L. REV. 711, 719 (2007).
119. O'Connor,422 U.S. at 575.
120. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1003 (2011) (limiting commitment to a temporary and
reasonable time).
121. See id. § 122C-263.
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French v. Blackburn

Shortly following the decisions in Jackson and O'Connor, the Court
affirmed a North Carolina case upholding the constitutionality of the state's
involuntary commitment proceedings found in chapter 122C of the North
Carolina General Statutes. 12 2 The U.S. District Court held:
The Court is of the general opinion that the North Carolina General
Assembly has enacted an excellent legislative scheme which adequately
protects the interests of all who may be involved in an involuntary
commitment proceeding. We perceive no reason to hold the statutory
provisions unconstitutional. There is no doubt that the liberty interest of a
person subjected to such proceedings is great and is an interest which has
long been protected and to which the state and this Court are obligated to
give great deference. 123
The Court proceeds to identify two "humanitarian purposes of the
involuntary commitment proceedings": (1) the temporary withdrawal from
society of those who are mentally ill and potentially dangerous; and (2) the
provision of treatment for those unable to seek it out for themselves. 124 The
Court additionally suggests, "the very purpose of that deprivation [of
liberty] is not solely to protect society but also has a purpose [for] the
protection, treatment, and aid of an individual who cannot or will not

protect himself."1 25
By rendering such a strong affirmation of the statutory requirements
of involuntary commitment, and by holding so firmly in favor of chapter
122C, the Court accepts the statutory presumption that persons held under
this scheme have the potential for rehabilitation towards competency.12 6
Like the cases before it, French fails to distinguish between the "mentally
ill" and the "mentally retarded" and does not account for the possibility that
one may not be able to regain competency. While it can be said that
French goes a long way to uphold the rights of the mentally illl 27 and even
those accused, but not tried, of a crime, it fails to protect those most
vulnerable to the effects of the statute.128

122. French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 443 U.S.
901 (1979).
123. Id. at 1354.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1004.
127. For example, the holding ensures that civil commitment will only be for a
reasonable time, allows for a step-down to outpatient treatment for non-dangerous
behaviors, etc. See French, 428 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
128. See supra PartI.
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III. NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
OF LIBERTY INTEREST

The North Carolina constitution provides for every individual's right
"to inquire into the lawfulness" of his or her confinement without undue
delay. 12 9 Commonly referred to as the right to a "speedy trial,"'13 0 the
constitution provides in part that "[e]very person restrained of his liberty is
entitled to a remedy to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove
the restraint if unlawful, and that remedy shall not be denied or delayed." 13 '
This right is intended to protect defendants from unreasonable pre-trial
The
incarcerations that may accompany criminal accusations.' 32
constitutional right is the foundation for the inherent public policy favoring
prompt resolution to criminal charges, and it acts as a reasonable balance
between the rights of an accused person and the ability of prosecutorial
authorities to seek justice.1 33 This balancing is "described as not affording
the defendant3 4 a 'sword for [his] escape, but rather . .. a shield for his

protection."'l

In State v. Pippin, the North Carolina Court of Appeals established a
reasonableness standard for determining whether a defendant's right to a
speedy trial has been abridged and held that a fourteen-month lapse in time
between a defendant's initial indictment .and the start of trial was prima
facie evidence of a violation of this right.' " The court adopted four
interrelated factors that the court must balance with the defendant's liberty
interest to determine whether the defendant's right to a speedy trial has
been abridged: "(1) [the] length of delay; (2) [the] reason for delay; (3)
defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) [the] prejudice to
defendant resulting from the delay." 13 6 These factors are not dispositive,
and a court must balance each factor with the specific circumstances of the

129. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
130. State v. Spivey, 579 S.E.2d 251, 254 (N.C. 2003) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 530 (1972)).
131. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 21. In addition to the N.C. constitution, the right to a "speedy
trial" is protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213, 222 (1967).
132. State v. Pippin, 324 S.E.2d 900, 903 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (citing United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).
133. Id. at 903 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 520).
134. Id. (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 903-04.
136. Id. at 903.
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crime charged and how the prosecution has developed its case against the
accused. 137
Applying the dispositional requirements listed in section 15A-1008 of
the North Carolina General Statutes to the reasonableness standard set forth
in the above four-factor test, it is difficult to see how the possible
dispositions comport with the constitutional requirements.' 3 According to
the statute, a person accused of a crime but never tried may not be held for
a period of more than the maximum allowable sentence for the crime
charged or ten years, whichever is less. 139 On its face, when viewed in light
of the Pippin factors, being confined for a period of ten years for a crime
for which a defendant is never tried or convicted of appears to be an
inherent violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial.
The
Massachusetts Supreme Court found this to be true when it held in favor of
a defendant, deemed incompetent to stand trial, yet involuntarily committed
for sixteen years. 140 The court held:
[Defendant] has effectively served more than the mandatory minimum
sentence on a charge for which he has never been convicted .... Under
these circumstances, it is unreasonable for the government to continue to
imprison [defendant] on the grounds that he might be declared competent
to stand trial on some future date.141
So how did Floyd Brown, and others like him,142 remain confined
without conviction or trial for over fourteen years? The answer lies more
in what is left unaccounted for by the United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence as well as what remains permissible by gaps in the North
Carolina statutory scheme governing involuntary commitment.
The Supreme Court decisions in Jackson and O'Connorprohibit the
indefinite confinement of mentally ill defendants who are incapable of
standing trial, but both decisions also permit the ongoing commitment of
defendants who pose a danger to themselves or to others.1 43 In the case of
defendants deemed "dangerous," the Court defers to the civil commitment
proceedings of the state.14 4 Likewise, in North Carolina, the Criminal
137. Id.

138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1008 (2011); see also supra note 58.
139. See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-1008.
140. See United States v. Ecker, 424 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270 (D. Mass. 2006).
141. Id.
142. See Crim. Code Comm. Comment., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A, subch. X, art. 56
(referring to the Criminal Code Commission's commentary recognizing several instances of
defendants committed to state institutions without trial or conviction).
143. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 564 (1975).
144. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
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Procedure Act, codified in chapter 15A of the North Carolina General
Statutes, requires that defendants found to be incompetent to stand trial
only be held temporarily until such time as a judge can determine the need
for longer-term commitment under the civil commitment statute, codified
45
in chapter 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes.1 This need is
based entirely on the defendant's likelihood of, or propensity for, being
dangerous.14 6 What remains is a civil commitment statute that permits the
involuntary commitment of so-called "dangerous" individuals who-at a
trial judge's discretion, with consultation from a physician-may be held
indefinitely following a criminal accusation and finding of future risk of
harm to self,14 7 for no other reason than that the person is mentally retarded,
i.e. "dangerous" in the eyes of the law.148 Viewed in light of article I,
section 21 of the North Carolina constitution, as well as the Pippin factors
applying the right to a speedy trial, this indicates a constitutional
deprivation of liberty.
IV. THE STATUTORY "DANGER" GAP
Indefinite involuntary commitment without criminal trial or conviction
is a consequence of the convergence of four factors: (1) the statutorily low
threshold for defining danger to self; 149 (2) the removal of the imminent
50
and overt acts requirement from the meaning of danger;1 (3) the court's
reliance on, and deference to, physician testimony as to the predictability of
a defendant's propensity for danger;1 "' and (4) the permissible evidentiary
52
minimum of hearsay allegations to begin the entire petitioning process.1
The DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for "mental retardation" state that in
addition to low intellectual functioning, a person must also have an underdeveloped ability to adapt and function in daily life without some level of
assistance. '5 Although the diagnostic criteria do not include a requirement
that such a lack of adaptive functioning place the individual in a danger of
145. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1003(b).
146. See id. § 122C-263; see also id. § 122C-3(11).
147. See id. § 122C-263.
148. See id.; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
149. See In re Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696, 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding noncompliance with medication and treatment team members as placing the patient at "high
risk" of both prongs of the statutory definition of danger, justifying involuntary
commitment).
150. See In re Collins, 271 S.E.2d 72, 76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
151. Id. at 75.
152. Collins, 271 S.E.2d at 76.
153. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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hurting himself, the implication is clear that without some level of support,
the person might be at risk. 15 4
The North Carolina General Statutes likewise make this implication
clear in the statutory definition of "Danger to himself,"ss and North
Carolina courts have confirmed this connection between danger and lack of
adaptive functioning.'5 6 Specifically, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
has-on more than one occasion, and for the purposes of justifying
involuntary civil commitment-permitted a low threshold for what may be
considered "dangerous to self."' 57 The Court stated, "We have held
specifically that the failure of a person to properly care for his/her medical
needs, diet, grooming and general affairs meets the test of dangerousness to
self."' 58 When viewed comparatively, it is difficult to see a clear
distinction between the medical definition of mental retardation and what
the state defines as dangerous behavior worthy of involuntary commitment.
Historically, the statutory definition of "danger" required either some
identification of overt acts by the accused or a showing that such acts were
imminent. 5 1 In 1979, the North Carolina General Assembly redefined the
term "Danger to himself' and in doing so removed the "imminent"
requirement.
In light of these showings not being required, the court
need only find an individual dangerous to himself based on considerations
of past acts, present sense impressions of an examining physician, or expert
testimony concerning the individual's propensity and risk for future
danger.' 6'
The court has upheld a predictability standard of determining
dangerousness, despite its recognizable flaws.16 2 "Empirical research
repeatedly demonstrates that mental health professionals remain unable to
predict accurately the dangerousness of any one individual." 6 3
154. See id at 44-45.
155. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(l l)(a)(1) (2011).
156. See In re Lowery, 428 S.E.2d 861, 864 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
157. See id
158. Id.
159. See In re Collins, 271 S.E.2d 72, 76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (referring to changes
reflected in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-58.1, -58.7 (1979) that delete the word "imminently"
in connection with the word "dangerous"); see also In re Monroe, 270 S.E.2d 537, 541
(N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing the removal of "overt acts" from the former standard of
"imminent" danger).
160. See Collins, 271 S.E.2d at 76.
161. See id. at 74.
162. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 11, at 189 (identifying commentary on this standard
suggesting that it is unreliable and unpredictable).
163. Id.
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Nevertheless, courts around the country have yet to "implement additional
due process safeguards to defend against unwarranted commitments,
instead accepting 'remarkably low levels of predictive accuracy' to justify
involuntary confinement."'6 What have resulted are courts willing to
accept "'mere prediction[s] of future harm, without evidence of an actual
fact, attempt, or threat of dangerous behavior"" 65 as justification for
indefinite civil commitment.' 66
A person facing involuntary commitment based on the dangerousness
standard need only to have been accused of a crime and determined by a
magistrate to be "probably mentally ill and . .. dangerous to self."l 67 In
fact, "[the statute] does not expressly state whether the affiant's knowledge
must be based on personal knowledge or whether it can be in whole or in
part based upon hearsay."l 68 The court goes on to explain, "[h]earsay
evidence is sufficient to support an affidavit supporting an arrest warrant,
even though not admissible to prove guilt at trial." 69 Under traditional
circumstances, such an accusation would be resolved at trial with a likely
exclusion of any non-excepted hearsay evidence. However, under the
circumstances of the mentally retarded defendant, he or she never reaches
the trial phase, and the court has upheld court orders for involuntary
commitment based entirely on hearsay evidence.1 70 Once the commitment
has taken place under this convergence of circumstances, chapter 122C of
the North Carolina General Statutes governs the continued confinement,
which-in the case of men like Floyd Brown-amounts to a virtual life
sentence.
V. CONCLUSION

North Carolina's criminal procedure and civil commitment statuteschapters 15A and 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes-viewed in
conjunction with the fundamental rights to liberty and unreasonable
restraint guaranteed by article I, sections 19 and 21 of the North Carolina
constitution-establish a public policy preventing criminal prosecution of
people who are unable to properly comprehend and participate in their own
164. Id. (citing R. LEVY & L. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES 31 (1996)).
165. Id. at 188 (citing LEVY, supra note 164).
166. Collins, 271 S.E.2d at 74.
167. In re Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696, 698 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-261(b) (2004) (emphasis added)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 699 (citations omitted).
170. Id. (citation omitted).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2013

23

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5

280

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:257

defenses."' Chapter 15A prohibits prosecution of criminal defendants who
lack the requisite capacity to proceed to trial and provides a means by
which defendants can be involuntarily committed in order to receive the
treatment necessary to establish capacity.172 If determined to lack capacity
to proceed to trial, chapter 15A permits a judge or magistrate to issue a
secure custody order placing defendants in an involuntary commitment
setting until such time as they have the capacity to proceed in their own
defense. 73 Once ordered and committed, the statutory regulations provided
in chapter 122C govern defendants' civil commitments, including the
showings required to justify a defendant's length of stay. 174
There is a significant gap in North Carolina's statutory scheme that
fails to clearly distinguish between criminal defendants who temporarily
lack capacity because of an interfering mental illness and those defendants
who permanently lack capacity because of an untreatable mental disability.
The statute does, however, create a clear distinction between those
defendants who present a danger and pose a risk-either to themselves or
to others in the community-and those who are merely mentally ill. While
this "danger" distinction reflects a compelling state interest in protecting
the community from potential harm by permitting a restriction on
individual liberty in order to achieve that end,' 7 5 the distinction is overly
inclusive.
Mental retardation is defined in the DSM-IV as the combination of
subaverage intellectual function and the significant impairment of adaptive
functioning in two or more life skills areas.' 7 6 "Danger to []self" is defined
in the North Carolina General Statutes as the inability, without supervision,
to care for one's self in the conduct of his daily "responsibilities and social
relations" combined with a risk of significant debilitation without proper
support.17 7 While the two definitions do not mirror one another, in a
practical application to defendants with mental retardation, they are so
significantly similar that it is possible to see their inherent connection.
Mental retardation requires a significant impairment in two or more life
skill areas, such as self-care, daily living requirements, diet, and

171.
(2011).
172.
173.
174.
175.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1001 to -08.
See id. § 15A-1003.
See generally id.§§ 122C-261 to -68.
See supra notes 34 and 67.

176. AM.PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N , supra note 77.
177. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(l 1).
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grooming. 178 Applying a reasonable inference, it can be deduced that
without support, care, or supervision in those areas, a person with mental
retardation could suffer significant debilitation, physical or otherwise.
Likewise, a determination of danger to self only requires an identification
of impairment in life skill areas and a physician prediction that without the
proper care, support, or supervision, the person is at risk of suffering
significant physical debilitation.' 79 Therein lies the statutory link between
mental retardation and a finding of "danger to self' that can lead to the
potential indefinite involuntary commitment of criminal defendants with
mental retardation.
Our criminal justice system is founded on the premise that defendants
are innocent until proven guilty, yet the statutory scheme provided in
chapters 15A and 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes, as applied
to defendants with mental retardation, has resulted in treatment of
presumably innocent defendants that reflects the opposite notion-if you
are accused of a crime and deemed a danger to yourself, the state has the
right, and perhaps the obligation, to confine you until such time as you can
prove your own innocence and safety. This is a notion that is impossible
for the mentally retarded defendant to prove.
The most significant solution needed to reverse the disparate treatment
of criminal defendants with mental retardation is to amend the current
statutory scheme found in chapters 15A and 122C, creating a distinction
between the incapacity to proceed caused by mental illness and the
incapacity to proceed caused by a permanent mental disability.
Additionally, the standards governing the involuntary commitment of
criminal defendants deemed incapable to proceed to trial and at risk of
being a danger to self should be revised to include a similar distinction.
Although the diagnostic criteria of "mental retardation" is not likely to
change, the legal definition of "Danger to himself' could be amended to
reflect a greater distinction between it and the criteria for diagnosing
mental retardation, closing the gap into which many defendants with
mental retardation fall. For example, this distinction could be achieved, in
part, by reinstating the requirement of showing a defendant's imminent risk
of danger to justify continued involuntary commitment. Once the risk has
subsided from imminent to merely possible, then the court could consider
alternative and less restrictive means of managing the defendant.
Regardless of the chosen language, to be most effective, an amended legal
definition will also require recognition by the courts and legislature of the
significant difference between mental illness and mental retardation. The
178. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N , supra note 77.
179. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(1 1).
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legislature will need to reflect the chronic and untreatable nature of mental
retardation in an amended statute, while the courts will need to recognize
the necessity to change its procedures dealing with, and dispositions
relating to, mentally retarded defendants.
Without amending current legislation, there are other procedural
changes that could help reduce the lengths of unreasonable involuntary
commitments, like the fourteen-year commitment sustained by Floyd
Brown. In fact, preceding chapter 15A of the North Carolina General
Statutes, in a commentary written by the Criminal Code Commission, the
very problem identified in this Comment is recognized, and the
Commission proposes a procedural solution-an increase in reporting to
the clerk of court in the county where the crime is alleged to have
occurred. 80
This measure would presumably increase the court's
awareness of the criminal defendant and require the court to render ongoing justifications for his continued involuntarily commitment.
Another procedural solution would be to require the appointment of a
Guardian ad Litem, or other court-appointed advocate, to every criminal
defendant deemed incapable of proceeding to trial based on his or her
mental retardation. Although this may not put a complete end to the
unreasonable lengths of involuntary commitment, it could be a significant
step toward ensuring that all criminal defendants are guaranteed adequate
and consistent representation for the duration of their criminal proceedings.
There are certainly criminal defendants with mental retardation who
have committed crimes and should be subject to punishment equal to those
defendants of average intelligence and capacity. However, there are also
criminal defendants like Floyd Brown who are unable to adequately
represent themselves in the justice system and who may be innocent of the
crimes with which they are charged-criminal defendants who, as a result
of a permanent disability, have their fundamental rights to life and liberty
restrained for unreasonable, and arguably unconstitutional, lengths of time.
While this Comment and its identified solutions are not a call for more
lenient treatment of defendants with mental retardation, it is an appeal for a
more reasoned, informed, and constitutionally-sound approach to ensuring
adequate protections for all defendants regardless of intellectual ability.
Brian T Lawler

180. See id. § 15A, subch. X, art. 56.
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